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INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the ethical aspects of
pandemic influenza planning necessarily
includes an overview of public health
strategies for influenza vaccine distribu-
tion.There are a number of challenges with
ethical overtones involved in planning for
distribution of what is surely likely to be
initially a very limited supply of influenza
vaccine. Central to this discussion is famil-
iarity with the role of influenza vaccine in
a pandemic, the rate at which vaccine is
likely to become available, who will likely
produce and “own” the vaccine, how the
vaccine distribution and administration
might be accomplished, and what are the
groups that might be deemed highest prior-
ity to be vaccinated against influenza. The
United States and Connecticut have been
considering the more challenging of these
issues, using the Canadian plan as a model
[1]. Canada has already discussed and
made decisions on the challenges related to
vaccine distribution.
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In order to consider the ethical issues around vaccine distribution during an influenza pan-
demic, it is critical to have an understanding of the role of influenza vaccine in a pandem-
ic, the rate at which vaccine is likely to become available, who will likely produce and “own”
the vaccine, how vaccine distribution and administration might be accomplished, and
which are the groups that might be deemed highest priority to be vaccinated against
influenza. The United States and Connecticut have been considering the more challenging
of these issues and have learned from Canada, which previously discussed and made
decisions on the challenges related to vaccine distribution. Although there is still some crit-
ical advance thinking that needs to be done, planning for the response to an influenza pan-
demic is now at an advanced stage. The keys to preparedness at this stage are to be
aware of the vaccine distribution options, to know the benefits and limitations of each
option, and to be flexible but nimble in dealing with a real pandemic.INFLUENZA CONTROL TOOLS
There are three main influenza control
tools once a pandemic starts: Vaccination,
antiviral agents, and limitation of expo-
sure. Each of these tools has its benefits
and limitations.
Vaccination is effective in preventing
both infection and severe disease. The
major limitations are that there may be lit-
tle to no vaccine initially and that it may
take two doses given no sooner than 30
days apart to achieve full protection.
Antiviral agents can be taken in antic-
ipation of exposure or at the time of expo-
sure to prevent infection. However, they
are only effective the days they are being
taken — they have no residual benefits.
Their use is limited by their cost, limited
supplies, side effects, resistance of some
influenza virus strains to them, and the
competing need to use them for treatment
instead of prevention.
Limitation of exposure to the influen-
za virus can protect the individual and
slow the spread of influenza in the popula-
tion.Avoidance of exposure can be done at
the individual level in several ways.
Healthy individuals can judiciously use
masks and handwashing and avoid close
contact with symptomatic persons.
Infectious ill persons can be effectively
isolated from others, and opportunities for
mass exposure and spread can be mini-
mized by limiting gatherings, including
school attendance. Curbing contact in con-
gregate settings may only be able to be
taken so far on a practical basis, however,
as there is a major potential for societal
and economic disruption.
Figure 1 shows schematically where
each of these prevention tools fit into an
emerging pandemic flu situation. Initially,
when there is little to no vaccine, we will
be dependent upon measures to limit expo-
sure and disease transmission and on
antiviral agent use. As we get more vac-
cine, vaccination will increasingly be the
key to limiting impact.
STRATEGIC VACCINATION
PLANNING ISSUES
There are three main strategic plan-
ning issues related to the use of vaccine:
First, how much vaccine is available?
Second, what are the goals for the use of
limited amounts of vaccine? Within this
second issue, what are the priority groups
for vaccination, and are two doses needed
or one? Finally, what is the most effective
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Figure 1. Timing of use of pandemic influenza response tools.distribution method to reach the goals?
Distribution will depend in part on who is
in charge of the vaccine supply and who is
in a position to administer the available
vaccine. In addition, there is a distribu-
tional choice to be made as to how much
vaccine is administered in private medical
versus public clinic settings.
Although eventually there will be
enough vaccine to vaccinate everyone, the
initial distribution strategy will depend in
part on how much is immediately available
and how quickly more will become avail-
able. The planning assumption provided by
the CDC is that initially, less than 10 per-
cent of needs will be met. It takes close to
six months from the time an influenza vac-
cine production line starts for the first doses
to be ready to be administered.
It is estimated that the maximum vac-
cine production rate for the country is 5
million doses per week. Assuming each
person will need two doses, that means
continued production will only be enough
to meet the needs of approximately 1 per-
cent of the U.S. population (2.8 million
people) each week. Thus, it could take up
to two years to produce enough vaccine to
fully vaccinate the entire population.
This rate could be improved substan-
tially if only one dose were needed per
person, if smaller doses of vaccine were
used (e.g., the vaccine were administered
intradermally [2]), or if more manufactur-
ers were able to produce for the U.S. mar-
ket. Decisions about dosage size and route
of administration would have to be made
by the FDA and be evidence-based. Thus,
data needs to be gathered in advance to
facilitate decision-making during a crisis.
GOALS FOR USE OF LIMITED
AMOUNTS OF VACCINE
A major issue needing resolution
when vaccines are in short supply is deter-
mination of the main goal for vaccine use.
In this context, there are at least three com-
peting strategic goals: One goal is preven-
tion of death. If that is the goal, then direct
protection of persons who are most vul-
nerable might be the best choice for the
initial use of vaccine. Another goal is pre-
vention of infection and its spread. If this
were our number one vaccination goal, we
should be vaccinating healthcare workers,
school-aged children, and, possibly, their
parents.Yet another goal is maintenance of
essential public services. To be sure criti-
cal services are not compromised by
absenteeism due to illness, we should
emphasize protection of certain classes of
workers. Unfortunately, there will not be
enough vaccine initially to work on all
three goals simultaneously — we will
have to make a choice.
Table 1 shows the priority groups to
achieve each of these goals and the percent-
age of the population that they make up.
Notably, there is little overlap between the
persons in these groups, with the exception
of healthcare workers, who appear in those
most likely to spread influenza and those
providing essential services.
The fact that two doses may be needed
to provide full immunity creates another set
of challenges to vaccination strategies [3].
First, a rapid study will be needed early on
to determine the relative efficacy of one
versus two doses.Acritical decision will be
needed as soon as possible. Should some
people get a second dose before giving
everyone a first dose? In addition, if two
doses are needed, then it will be important
to let everyone know they need another
dose and to keep records to enable
reminders and call-backs for a second dose.
VACCINE DISTRIBUTION
A critical determinant of initial vac-
cine distribution strategy is who controls
the vaccine supply and, thus, its distribu-
tion. Since vaccine is made by private
manufacturers, this is not a simple answer.
There are three major options for dis-
tribution from the manufacturer: First, the
vaccine manufacturer can control the
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come-first serve or from the highest bid-
ders. Second, the government can pur-
chase a percentage of the supply and con-
trol its subsequent distribution. This is the
usual case for most vaccines when there is
no crisis, including influenza vaccine. On
average, government at federal, state and
local levels purchases 20 to 30 percent of
the supply for use for special public health
initiatives and for vaccination of the poor-
er segment of the population, with the
manufacturer distributing the rest accord-
ing to supply and demand. The third
option is for the government to purchase
the whole supply, ideally at a pre-negotiat-
ed price, and then be entirely in charge of
distribution.
When vaccine is in very short supply
relative to demand, only the third scenario
is likely to work well and be enforceable.
Notably, it cost the public health system an
extraordinary amount of money and time
during the 2004-05 influenza season try-
ing to redistribute the initially unevenly
and largely privately purchased and dis-
tributed vaccine when there was a sudden
influenza vaccine shortage [4].
Because of the importance of this
issue, in 2002, stakeholders were brought
together by CDC to develop recommenda-
tions regarding federal purchase of
influenza vaccine in a time of shortage.
They recommended federal purchase of all
vaccine during the time of peak demand
relative to supply [5]. However, thus far,
no national decision or commitment to do
so has been made public. Thus, prepared-
ness efforts at the state level need to
account for multiple possibilities.
Once vaccine ownership is estab-
lished, its subsequent distribution will
depend in part on who will administer it.
Usually, influenza vaccine is administered
in a variety of settings. Most primary care
providers administer it to their own
patients including those in long-term care
facilities, accounting for 70 to 80 percent
of vaccination. Historically, to reach those
with less regular medical care, there have
been public-sector clinics open to all com-
ers. Public sector initiatives account for
about 20 to 30 percent of all vaccination.
More recently, special workplace employ-
ee clinics and commercial clinics open to
all comers have been added to encourage
increasingly large segments of the popula-
tion to get vaccinated.
In a pandemic situation, there will be
substantial challenges to “usual” practice.
Even without a pandemic, the generally
intense two-month long influenza vaccina-
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Table 1. Potential priority groups, make-up and size for initial use of influenza
vaccine.
Most medically vulnerable: (30%)
• Persons >65 years; Long-term care facility residents
• Persons 2 to 64 years with underlying conditions
• Infants 6 to 23 months
Most likely to spread: (25%)
• Staff in institutions. (Long-term care, hospitals, corrections)
• Daycare and school-aged children
Essential service providers: (10%)
• Health care, mortuary (5%)
• Key decision-makers & emergency response leaders
Police, fire, water, utilities (gas, electric), transportation of food supplies (5%)tion season puts a substantial burden on
primary care providers, who must balance
vaccination with provision of acute med-
ical care. Most recently, pediatricians, in
response to new recommendations first
made during the 2003-04 season [6] are
struggling with how to get two doses into
all their patients who are 6 to 23 months of
age over a two-month time period. During
a pandemic, there will be a huge surge in
acute care needs, which will decrease the
time available for preventive care.
To make matters worse, it is likely
that patients will be demanding and that
there will be those who demand vaccine
even if they are not in an initial priority
group. This puts the provider in a terribly
awkward position: If they enforce the rec-
ommendations and withhold vaccine from
one of their patients, they could lose
clients. Beginning in January 1998, Rhode
Island had a community outbreak of
meningococcal meningitis and decided to
recommend vaccination of all children [7].
While they started with the premise that it
could be done by regular pediatric care
providers purchasing vaccine on their
own, the providers quickly became over-
whelmed by long lines and demanding
parents. In the end, the state bought all the
vaccine needed and held special vaccina-
tion clinics. In such situations, special
clinics take the burden off of acute care
providers. However, special clinics still
face the challenge of enforcing the recom-
mendations that only certain people be
vaccinated. In this context, government-
run public health clinics are usually in a
better position than hospital or provider-
run clinics to do such enforcement, in
large part because they are able to call on
public safety personnel to assist.
There are three main options for who
administers vaccine: 100 percent private
sector, the usual private-public sharing, or
100 percent public sector vaccine adminis-
tration. Most likely there will be a combi-
nation strategy, with more public sector
administration initially followed by
increasing involvement of the private sec-
tor as vaccine supply becomes sufficient to
meet demand.
At the user level, people will need to
know where they will get vaccinated,
whether it will be at work, at their usual
healthcare provider’s office, in a public
clinic with lines and waits, or in a public
clinic by appointment. If appointments are
needed, they will need to know how they
can get an appointment. The dissemination
of this information will likely be done by
state and local public health officials.
The settings where vaccine is admin-
istered will be an extension of who con-
ducts the vaccine administration and what
groups are first priority. If healthcare
providers are the priority group, most like-
ly vaccine will be given to them to vacci-
nate each other. If the elderly or children
are the priority, vaccination may be done
either by their regular care providers or in
special clinics by appointment. During the
2004-05 influenza season with the influen-
za vaccine shortage, we found that in
Connecticut we could successfully use a
variety of settings to get vaccine to the pri-
ority groups [8]. The likelihood that vac-
cine will be in extremely short supply rel-
ative to demand will make enforcement
more of a challenge than achieving high
volume.
VACCINATION STRATEGY
PLANNING
There has been long-standing advice
to all states to conduct pandemic influenza
planning and to have a plan. However,
until 2005, guidance was limited. There
was no national plan to use as a model, and
it was only recommended, not required,
that states do planning.
In the past several years, much has
happened. The combination of concern
about the evolving avian influenza situa-
tion and the emphasis in the past few years
on public health preparedness created the
demand and planning mechanisms neces-
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draft national response plan was distrib-
uted [9]. In addition, states were required
to have their own written response plans in
place as of August 2005 as a condition of
receiving federal public health prepared-
ness and immunization program funding.
The resulting individual state plans are
available on the DHHS website [10].
The initial draft national plan devel-
oped in August 2005 on which state plans
were based was not complete. In particu-
lar, it did not include specific guidance on
vaccination strategies or priority groups.
Since then, a list of priority groups to
receive initially available vaccine has been
developed by the CDC and DHHS work-
groups and published as part of the com-
plete national DHHS pandemic influenza
response plan in November 2005 [11].
The process for developing guidance
for vaccination strategies is ongoing. For
the recently completed phase to develop
vaccine priority groups, it consisted of con-
vening three separate working groups, each
of which made recommendations on vacci-
nation priorities. These groups included a
special CDC workgroup, the DHHS’s
National Vaccine Advisory Committee
(NVAC), and the CDC’s Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP).The groups met in parallel and had
some overlapping members. The key
charge to each group was to discuss and
make recommendations on vaccination
goals and which groups should have prior-
ity for vaccination. Since Canada had
already addressed these issues [1], each
group was charged with beginning with the
Canadian priority groups and determining
whether modifications should be made.
The three national planning groups
each included representatives from med-
ical organizations, such as the American
Medical Association and the American
Hospital Association; from public health
organizations, including state and local
health departments; and an ethicist. NVAC
also had consumer representation.
Of importance, the ACIP is the only
group that can put out recommendations
that are truly independent; meaning, they
do not have to be reviewed by federal offi-
cials for policy considerations. Their inde-
pendence in being able to make recom-
mendations regarding who should be vac-
cinated in advance against smallpox was
valued by many in the medical and public
health communities.
National level planning has been tak-
ing place with the following scenario in
mind. First, it has been assumed, until
proven otherwise, that all persons will
need two doses of vaccine. Second, it is
assumed that all will be fully susceptible
to the pandemic strain. Third, the rate of
vaccine production will not exceed
enough to vaccinate 1 percent of the U.S.
population with two doses each week.
These are all “worst-case” scenario
assumptions — it may be that only one
dose of vaccine would be needed, only
certain age groups in the population would
be fully susceptible, and that vaccine pro-
duction could be faster or stretched by
using smaller doses for vaccination, as
previously mentioned.
At this time, it is unclear who at the
federal level will decide on other aspects
of vaccination strategies, particularly the
key question of whether all vaccine will be
purchased by the federal government at
the beginning.
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC
HEALTH PLANNING PROCESS
State and local health departments
have the responsibility to determine how
to carry out the national guidance in their
jurisdictions. In particular, states have the
responsibility of distributing limited sup-
plies purchased with federal funding to
providers, including local health depart-
ments, and local health departments have
responsibility for determining how pub-
licly purchased vaccine will be adminis-
tered in their towns.
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es vaccine priority groups but provides no
clear guidance on vaccine distribution
strategies, states have had to make their
own planning assumptions in order to
move ahead.
In Connecticut, the national planning
scenario and priority groups have been the
basis for planning. In addition, we assume
that all vaccine initially will be purchased
by the state and federal government. The
current Connecticut vaccine distribution
plan is that vaccine would be given direct-
ly to hospitals to vaccinate their staff.
Most vaccine, though, would be given to
local health departments on a population
basis to hold special clinics to vaccinate
the priority groups in their areas and to
enable enforcement of the recommenda-
tions. To deal with the issue of having
some very small, part-time local health
departments that are inadequately staffed,
the state has been divided into 41 mass
vaccination regions with a population of at
least 50,000 each. Each of these is headed
by a full-time health director and receives
substantial public health preparedness
funding. These regions are prepared to do
mass vaccination or antibiotic dispensing
in case of an emergency, and are also
charged with vaccination activities related
to pandemic influenza.
VACCINATION PRIORITY GROUPS
The Canadians determined three main
objectives of vaccination in hierarchical
order: 1) limit societal disruption and
maintain essential services; 2) limit severe
morbidity and mortality; and 3) prevent
influenza (Table 2). Notably, the number
one priority within this group is vaccina-
tion of healthcare providers. This includes
all hospital and medical office staff —
including support staff. This group is the
one with the highest risk of contact with
influenza and the one that will likely have
the largest workload with an explosion of
ill persons seeking care.
The second priority group is essential
service providers, a fairly broadly consti-
tuted group that includes government
leaders. Some in these groups would like
their family members included, feeling
that there is a risk they could bring
influenza home to family members and
claiming that many will refuse to work
unless all in their families are also protect-
ed. This poses interesting ethical issues.
The Canadian plan is clear that family
members of these groups are not included.
The U.S. vaccine priority groups iden-
tified through the previously described
process (Table 3) are similar to those iden-
tified by Canada. However, there are sev-
eral notable differences. While the highest
priority Canadian groups include a wide
range of essential service providers fol-
lowed by all at excess risk of severe mor-
bidity, the U.S. priority groups interdigitate
narrower definitions of essential service
providers with those at decreasingly high
risk for severe morbidity and mortality. In
other words, the U.S. recommendations
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Table 2. Vaccination goals and priority groups: Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan,
February 2004.
1. Limit societal disruption — maintain essential services
a. Health care providers
b. Essential service providers
2. Limit severe morbidity and mortality:
a. Persons at high risk from fatal outcomes
3. Prevent influenza:
a. Healthy children and adults 2 to 64 yearsemphasize prevention of morbidity and
mortality more than maintenance of all but
the most essential influenza-related health-
care services. In addition, the U.S. recom-
mendations do not explicitly address
whether family members of essential ser-
vice providers are included when essential
service providers are listed as priority.
CRITICAL PLANNING DECISION-
MAKING IN CONNECTICUT
Advance planning decisions on how
best to distribute and administer vaccine
within the state are and will be made using
the infrastructure that has been developed
for public health preparedness planning.
This includes three separate but overlap-
ping groups that meet at least monthly
with flexible agendas to enable discussion
of emerging issues such as SARS and
response to avian influenza. The first is the
public health preparedness advisory work-
group, which is broadly constituted and
includes local health and hospital repre-
sentation as its core, but also representa-
tion from most health professional organi-
zations in the state. This group is one that
could readily incorporate an ethics per-
spective, something that is currently miss-
ing. The second planning group is hospi-
tal-specific. Each of the two public health
preparedness center of excellence hospi-
tals has monthly meetings with all other
hospitals in their half of the state to coor-
dinate and standardize hospital-specific
preparedness response protocols. Finally,
the public health preparedness manage-
ment group consists of 10 DPH and seven
local health department staff members, a
group that does final decision-making on
how federal public health preparedness
funding coming through the CDC is spent
and discusses preparedness issues most
relevant to them.
No single public health strategy for
influenza vaccine distribution in a pan-
demic has yet been determined. Rather,
there are a number of key decision points
where there are strategic options for how
vaccines in short supply can be distributed
(Figure 2). These include deciding
whether the government purchases all
available vaccine, who will be highest pri-
ority to be vaccinated initially, whether
regular or public health providers will do
the bulk of vaccine administration, and
whether the available supply can be
stretched to go further by using alternative
administration methods.
The strategic options for vaccine dis-
tribution are likely to be affected by the
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Table 3. Vaccine Priority Group Recommendations: DHHS Pandemic Influenza Plan,
November 2005.*
Priority Vaccination Goal Group
1 Maintain essential services • Vaccine & antiviral manufacturers
• Medical & public health workers with
direct patient contact & support staff,
vaccinators
2 Limit severe morbidity • Persons at high risk of severe disease
3 Maintain essential services • Public health emergency workers
• Key government leaders
4 Limit severe morbidity • Persons at moderately high risk of severe
disease
5 Maintain essential services • Public safety, utility, transportation,
communication workers, funeral directors,
other public health & government workers
6 Prevent influenza • Healthy adults and children, 2 to 64 years old
* Adapted from DHHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Part 1, Appendix D, Table D-1.rapidity of spread and the severity of a pan-
demic. How quickly the pandemic strain
gets to the United States, whether there is
initially any vaccine, how easily it is
spread, how virulent it is and which groups
are most affected are all variables that
could influence choice of strategic options.
Although there is still some critical
advance thinking that needs to be done,
planning for the response to an influenza
pandemic is now at an advanced stage. The
keys to preparedness at this stage are to be
aware of the vaccine distribution options,
to know the benefits and limitations of
each option, and to be flexible but nimble
in dealing with a real pandemic.
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